KATHMANDU: Deepak Sharma, a British citizen of Nepali origin, was the then-representative of Allen Aircraft Radio Corporation (AAR), an American provider of aircraft maintenance services, the company that sold two Airbus A330-200 series aircraft purchased by Nepal Airlines Corporation. The deal was carried out under Sharma’s leadership.

The business transaction, which took place seven years ago, continues to reverberate—not only in Nepal but even in the United States. The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a case against Sharma and others for allegedly colluding to increase the price and supplying aircraft with lower flight-weight capacity. The Special Court has already delivered its verdict, ordering compensation and fines exceeding Rs 240 million collectively from Sharma and 12 others.

Meanwhile, the U.S. court proceedings concluded two months ago. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on June 27 that Sharma must pay approximately Rs 50 million, which includes a $130,000 bonus received from AAR Corporation’s profits, a $150,000 fine, and interest. This decision came despite evidence that funds were transferred opaquely from Ireland to the UAE while the company continued to support the deal.

Additionally, Sharma has been sentenced to a three-year probation period in the United States, meaning he will remain under government supervision while in the country.

The following is an edited excerpt from that interview:

For many years, there has been a lot of discussion about you in Nepal. Eight months ago, the Special Court already gave its verdict on the case filed by the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) regarding the wide-body aircraft procurement, and the full text of the decision has also been published. Apart from your written response, weren’t you involved in any stage of the case proceedings?
I also came to know that the verdict and full text had been published. As far as the case is concerned, I was not aware of much before the CIAA filed the chargesheet, or even prior to that.

During the investigation phase, I did not receive any letters from the CIAA. We only came to know after the case had already been filed. Now, if you ask about my involvement, look—I was an employee of a corporation, an employee of the American company AAR Corporation. As an employee, I had worked on this deal on behalf of the corporation, not as its leader.

Without even taking a single statement from me, without any communication, the case was directly filed in Nepal. But after I found out, as a matter of respect, I sent a written statement to the Special Court. That is also included in the full text of the verdict. I have great faith in the judiciary. Believing that ultimately, we will get justice from the Supreme Court, we are moving ahead with an appeal.

Did the CIAA not contact you for a statement during its investigation?
No, the CIAA did not contact me.

But they did issue a notice in the newspapers. There is a tradition of issuing public notices in daily papers. Perhaps the CIAA followed that process
Now, that may be Nepal’s procedure. In a way, let’s call it a ‘draconian’ process, an old system that has been followed from the past. For those of us living abroad, it is not possible to keep track of what is published in which Nepali newspaper. In any legal process, there is a procedure for correspondence, there is something called “serving a summons.” If you want to connect it with this, even in America there was a case in this regard.

In May 2021, the U.S. government, through the British government, contacted me under a proper procedure, saying: “We need to speak with you, please come to meet us. But before you meet us, you must hire your own lawyer. We do not talk outside the presence of a lawyer.” After that, I hired a lawyer. Under that process, I went to the U.S. several times. Discussions were held openly and in a climate of trust. I gave my statement there, and now that case has already been concluded—it was wrapped up just a month ago.

We will talk about the U.S. case later. In Nepal, however, the CIAA charged you with colluding to raise the aircraft price, and also with supplying a plane with 230 tons payload capacity instead of the 242 tons capacity that had been specified, without reducing the price. Based on this, the Special Court decided to fine you and recover a loss equivalent to Rs 240 million in your name. Why didn’t you come to give your statement? Why did you let the case proceed one-sidedly? Why didn’t you submit your defense on time?
During the legal process in America, I had an agreement with the government there. In a way, I was a witness. Under the corporate company’s prosecution, according to that agreement, I was not permitted to speak to or give statements to any other body on this matter. Therefore, it was not that I disobeyed Nepal’s legal system or ignored Nepali law; I was legally bound.

One thing we need to understand is that the issues of price escalation and payload capacity were not part of the American court proceedings at all. They never even looked into these two matters. These were not seen as problems. These are issues raised only in Nepal, in the chargesheet, under two separate counts.

Now, first let’s talk about the issue of price escalation. Whenever a new aircraft is purchased, there is annual price escalation due to rising worker salaries and costs of materials. This escalation schedule is determined by the government, not by Dipak Sharma, nor by any other company involved, nor by NAC employees. The same kind of price escalation also happened when Nepal Airlines purchased A320 aircraft in 2014–2015.

When we submitted our proposal for the tender, we clearly mentioned in the disclaimer that there would be price escalation adjustment. The explanation of that adjustment was written to be clarified in the purchase agreement. This is a global practice whenever new aircraft are procured. And here, one very important point: while the percentage of escalation we had to pay Airbus was 4.5 percent, what we received was only 2.44 percent. NAC employees, looking after the corporation’s interest, negotiated with us and finalized it at less than two-and-a-half percent.

But Nepal’s Public Procurement Law allows for price escalation only in construction works, not in goods procurement. How can it be justified that a mistake was made during the earlier narrow-body A320 purchase, and so the same mistake should be allowed here as well?
It is not Dipak Sharma’s role to amend Nepal’s procurement laws and regulations to make them international according to current contexts. That is something the country and the Parliament must do. And how can you say that price escalation happened only in the narrow-body case? Didn’t it happen when two Boeing 757s were purchased? Those were also new aircraft, bought directly from Boeing. At that time too, there was price escalation. So how was that a mistake? Even before that, when NAC bought Boeing 727s, there was price escalation. Back then too, one was new and one was old. For the new aircraft, escalation was paid. For the old aircraft, escalation was not paid—because an old aircraft retains its existing value.

But wasn’t there no mention of “brand new” aircraft in the call? The requirement was for aircraft with less than one thousand flight hours, which suggests allowance for used planes. Isn’t that why the chargesheet and others allege this was for purchasing second-hand aircraft?

We delivered “brand new” aircraft directly from Airbus’s factory. I myself went to Kathmandu for the delivery.

At first the delivery was to be made within 12 months, but it happened after 18 months. Didn’t the extra six months significantly contribute to the escalation? The chargesheet also shows that you deliberately prolonged negotiations by adding conditions, thus causing delay. Isn’t that the case?
What they allege in the chargesheet is one thing. But if you look at the reality, the Pre-Delivery Payment (PDP) deposit—about Rs 80 million—was delayed by almost four months from Nepal’s side. Until the PDP is made, the aircraft delivery cannot be confirmed. The delay in delivery happened because the payment process was late. On the production line, aircraft are constantly being built. Production doesn’t stop. Just like in a car factory—if the required deposit doesn’t come, the next customer who pays the deposit gets it. For aircraft too, the delivery is only confirmed after the deposit is received. So, there is no basis to point fingers at the seller.

But when the Employees Provident Fund and Citizens Investment Trust—who were providing the investment—asked for proof that the aircraft was being manufactured, didn’t you take a lot of time just to provide that evidence?
No. We had already sent correspondence in the beginning. In that, we had stated that the aircraft would fall within this particular manufacturer’s number and range. But in the agreement, the actual manufacturer’s number would only be fixed once the deposit was received. The delay happened because the deposit was late. To say money was increased, or that there was manipulation, or deliberate delay—that is baseless.

Let’s move to another issue. When Nepal Airlines issued the Request for Proposal (RFP), the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) was mentioned as 242 tons. Based on that, you quoted a price of USD 104 million. But by the time the agreement was finalized, it dropped to 230 tons. It’s widely said—even in the charge sheet and verdict—that this was a major fraud.
It’s true that the RFP asked for 242 tons. It’s also true that when we first placed the bid, it was for 242 tons. Later, as the process moved forward, the MTOW was revised down to 230 tons—that is also true. But apart from this, all the conspiracy claims are baseless.

Look here, this is an Airbus document. It’s essentially proof. After the decision to buy the aircraft, Airbus itself carried out the performance evaluation/analysis and reported that given Kathmandu’s geographical situation—its airport elevation and runway length—the MTOW could not exceed 211 tons. This was Airbus’s own report at that time. Back then, Nepal did not have any other international airports.

So for flights in and out of Kathmandu, the recommendation was to buy aircraft with a 230-ton limit. If you took 242 tons, the same takeoff limitations would apply. Another important point is that this is a safety issue. Even today, Nepal is on the European Union’s aviation blacklist.

The manufacturer itself recommended this. Their analysis showed that in case of an emergency event—say, an aborted takeoff without reaching the required speed—if the weight exceeded the safe limit, the plane wouldn’t be able to stop on the runway; it would overshoot. The same applies during landing: with excess weight, the aircraft cannot stop within the designated distance. For this reason, Airbus recommended lowering the MTOW—purely for safety.

But you had quoted USD 104 million for a 242-ton aircraft. Once it dropped to 230 tons, shouldn’t the price also have decreased? Why didn’t it?
When an aircraft is still in production at the factory, changes in MTOW—whether up or down—do not significantly affect the price. Once the aircraft rolls out of production, or years later if you want to modify it, then the costs become much higher. At the time we agreed to 230 tons, the price difference was minimal. The adjustment was done for safety reasons, not for commercial reasons.

Right now, they’re saying: “To make it 242 tons today, how much would it cost?” and based on that current figure, they’ve filed a case against us. But those are fabricated accusations, not based on the facts of what actually happened back then.

But even back then, Bhairahawa Airport was under construction. So why did you only base the calculations on Kathmandu? Isn’t that a valid question?
But even today, Airbus A330s can’t operate from Bhairahawa. Two years ago, when an A330 was landed there, it got stuck because the turning radius was insufficient. At that time, the infrastructure wasn’t ready at all. Feasibility studies are always based on the current reality, not future speculation. If Nepal buys planes tomorrow, then calculations can be based on Nijgadh Airport. But we must work with facts, not assumptions about the future.
It’s been seven years since the wide-body aircraft have been in operation. They have paid salaries, kept the airline running. I’ve seen press releases saying, “We repaid this much loan.” That means the aircraft are functioning.

At first, there were rumors that no planes existed at all. Then, people said the aircraft were old. After that, they said the engines were old. A Nepali team even came to France insisting on inspecting the engines because of such rumors. They saw for themselves that the aircraft were indeed new.

For seven years, those planes have been generating revenue. And yet, I am the one carrying the burden of this case. Meanwhile, five Chinese planes bought six years ago have been sitting idle under the sun—neither operational nor sellable, and now essentially scrap metal. But there’s no investigation, no case against that. That’s a huge irony—for us, for Nepalis, and for people working in Nepal’s interest.

The Special Court verdict states that the investigation was “selective” and has ordered a separate inquiry into bribery. But you’ve still been convicted and fined Rs 240 million in damages and penalties. What will you do now?
We were convicted purely because we were absent. It was a conviction in absentia, without any defense from our side. On top of that, we are foreign nationals. I am a British citizen; others are German, Portuguese, American. Even without being present, we were convicted. That’s another issue altogether. But since we disagree with this ruling, the law provides us the path to appeal to the Supreme Court, and we will.
Another point: The Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed charges in April 2024. But in February, a press release and news reports had already emerged quoting an official from the Ministry of Law, saying the U.S. Embassy had written to them about 15 people related to the wide-body case. But the names of those 15 were never revealed.

Since 2021, I have been cooperating with the U.S. government. The 2024 letter from the U.S. Embassy to Nepal’s Ministry of Law proves that investigations were ongoing. So how can anyone say there was no investigation? I am a bit confused—was there no investigation, or was it incomplete? On what basis was the charge sheet ultimately filed?

The charges were selective. Some people were not prosecuted at all, some were acquitted. Mostly, only certain employees were targeted. The Special Court itself said in its ruling that the investigation was “selective.” So there must now be a full, transparent investigation. That’s what we have also demanded.

In your view, why was it “selective”?
It definitely was selective.

Can you give specific examples?
Yes, they even mentioned the name of the head of the CIAA in the case documents—yet no investigation was conducted against him. Another big issue is this: this was a commercial deal. Even the full text of the verdict acknowledges that. Then why was a commercial deal turned into a criminal case—especially targeting me?

I believe it’s because I am of Nepali origin. Otherwise, it should have been handled as a corporate “company-to-company” case. If Nepal Airlines wasn’t satisfied, the Sales and Purchase Agreement (SPA) had provisions for arbitration in London. But instead, they filed a criminal case against individuals.

The company that made the profit has CEOs, presidents, and owners. Why weren’t they targeted? Have you ever seen the photo of any foreigner splashed across Nepali media like mine? In the press, it’s always “Dipak Sharma ate, Dipak Sharma looted, Dipak Sharma paid off.”

I brought in two aircraft worth 218 million USD, but only I was made the target of a media trial. That shows the selectiveness—not just in the CIAA, but in the media too.

So, you mean the case should have been filed against AAR Corporation, but instead it was against you personally?
Exactly. I was personally targeted. Why? Because I am of Nepali origin. Have you ever seen Nepali media publicly defaming a foreigner involved in this? No.

Do you really believe it’s only because you are of Nepali origin
One hundred percent. Yes. I am British, but of Nepali descent. I came here at a young age—it’s been 32 years now. My connection with Nepal Airlines is very old. My father worked at Nepal Airlines for 38 years before retiring. I have personally and professionally supported Nepal Airlines for a long time.

Did that family connection with Nepal Airlines give you some extra advantage in the procurement process?
No, just because I sold to Nepal Airlines doesn’t mean I would sell at a loss—whether it’s a spare part or an aircraft. Neither morality nor business principles allow that. Any company always seeks profit. Nobody works for free. So no, I didn’t sell at a loss.

In Nepal, there’s a pattern of humiliating people after every aircraft purchase. During the Boeing 757 era, Baliram Singh was chased out with a garland of shoes. Later, during the Airbus A320 deal, Sugat Ratna Kansakar was arrested. This isn’t new—it’s become a tradition. We Nepalis love conspiracy theories.

But because of that old relationship, some say you even drafted the RFP for the wide-body deal. Wasn’t it all a collusion?
That’s an old allegation. Yes, I had a good relationship with Nepal Airlines. But whenever I made agreements with them, I worked in their best interest. Ask honest former employees—they’ll confirm that. Relationships matter in business.

But the RFP draft was prepared by Nepal Airlines staff. There was a committee for it. In countries where many RFPs aren’t drafted regularly, it’s common to seek external feedback to check for errors or improvements. They asked others too—not just me.

Yes, it’s true they asked me to “look at it once.” My input was that since many companies might submit bids—including those unable to deliver planes or mere brokers—it would be wise to include provisions for a bid bond or earnest money deposit.

I also suggested that only publicly listed and financially strong companies should be eligible. That way, Airbus, Boeing, and all other publicly listed firms could participate. This was not secret advice—it was open.

In the end, 11 publicly listed companies submitted bids. My only recommendation was that. If I had manipulated the process so that only our company could win, then accusations of corruption would make sense. But that’s not what happened.

You mentioned Airbus earlier. Even when it met the criteria, why did Airbus not participate? What was the reason?
There have been many such reports in the past. At the time of purchasing the Airbus-320, Sugat was even arrested and kept for one day over the issue of returning the “commitment fee.” In the Airbus-320 case itself, a case was filed in a French court, where it was confirmed that an agent had taken USD 2.5 million. That is why Airbus did not want to touch it. In such a situation, who would want to touch it? As far as I think, that is the reason they didn’t go for it, they didn’t bid. I also mentioned Boeing. They could have brought it, or others could have brought it too.

But wasn’t the specification only for Airbus?
Yes, the aircraft was of Airbus specification. Boeing Capital has its own group, where they also deal in “used aircraft” of other manufacturers.

If anyone had come to offer at less than 11, that would be another matter. But what happens here is, the parliamentary committee, counting from 2008, initially brought up that Deepak Sharma was involved in 4 billion worth of corruption. Then it was said the aircraft was not new, the engine was old. Later, when it reached the CIAA, it became a total of 2 billion or less in corruption. Now the court itself has also said— “What exactly happened in America in Deepak Sharma’s case, investigate that USD 2.5 million. Now the question we must ask—was it Rs 4 billion, Rs 2 billion, or Rs 300 million in corruption? Which one is it?

You brought up the context already. High Fly X, a company registered in Ireland, received money from Nepal Airlines, which then went elsewhere. But a suspicious amount of USD 2.5 million went into an account in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On this very matter, your case was tried in an American court, in which you were also penalized. Can we hear your version on this?
I resigned from AAR Corporation in April 2019. They reported to the US government in July, suspecting that “something might have happened.” They reported one matter about South Africa and one about Nepal. These two are entirely different. Regarding Nepal, they only mentioned it up to the level of “possible.” Because of that possibility, the US government had to inquire with me, and that is why I went through the process there.

I was a “witness” for the US government. I had to tell them what AAR Corporation had, what was done. I had to explain whether there was unethical activity or not, and if so, to what extent. On June 27, 2025, before the Honorable Judge Amit Mehta, I went to the DC court, and the judgment was delivered.

You raised a very important matter about the USD 25 million. Let me give you the papers—look at item number 35, where it says that Deepak Sharma stated that the USD 2.5 million “may have been used in some way,” “understood possibly used”—that is the only statement.

Here, I am showing another document of the South Africa case, where a South African “JV partner” clearly listed in point 32 exactly which people were paid how much. It was proven one hundred percent. But in Deepak Sharma’s case, only “could have been” is mentioned. In South Africa’s context, AAR Corporation’s man was proven to have bribed government officials with clear evidence. But in Nepal, such evidence is absent. This, we need to understand.

In the South African deal, AAR Corporation earned USD 24 million in profit. In Nepal, the company earned USD 6 million profit. So, in total, it made USD 30 million in profit. Out of this, acknowledging its own fault, it paid a fine of USD 55 million. According to this, Nepal’s share of that was about USD 9 million, not the entire USD 55 million.

Its main problem was South Africa, where its appointed person was proven to have bribed. In Nepal, it was not proven. The USD 2.5 million deposited in the UAE was stated to have been paid under a “cooperation agreement.” The US government did forensic analysis on this. They also asked me, and I told them—this money did not go outside the UAE.

Why were you penalized in the American court then?
The agreement was signed in 2017, and the aircraft was sold to Nepal Airlines in 2018. But AAR Corporation realized the profit already in 2017. The fault lay with the company in accounting. A publicly listed company is not allowed to recognize profit before delivery of goods—that was the government’s position. Because profit was recognized in 2017, AAR Corporation gave me a USD 130,000 bonus. The US government and court said since this was given based on mismatched accounts, I had to return the bonus.

Recognizing profit before the aircraft was delivered, and showing annual income, was seen as misleading shareholders. Since I knew this and still supported the company, I was fined.

Another point: Nepal scores 34 on the Corruption Perception Index, indicating high corruption. I was aware that bribery could be involved, yet I chose to continue with the company instead of resigning. For that decision, I was fined an additional USD 150,000. Altogether, I paid around Rs 50 million in penalties. But I also have a question. The question is—if I had to return the bonus, even the US government itself said Deepak Sharma gained nothing personally. Then, delivering new aircraft to Nepal, returning the money I had earned—does that make me corrupt, or patriotic?

But AAR Corporation paid USD 55 million fine and got away by putting you up front, didn’t they?
Yes, they did put me forward. For them, it was easier to push a Nepali forward. Being Nepali here turned out to be a big crime.

But aren’t you British now? How are you Nepali?
No, in my heart I am Nepali. Looking at me, no one would say I am British either.

So, does this mean, once their work was done, they abandoned you?
They carried me forward and fired the gun from my shoulder. This was not only about AAR Corporation. From this deal, other foreign nationals and companies also profited. Where are their photos being published? Where is their humiliation and character assassination? Just because I am Nepali, even Nepali newspapers print my picture. To be born in Nepal, to work in Nepal, turned out to be a crime.

And that USD 2.5 million—where did it go from UAE?
I also don’t know. The US government also doesn’t know. From what we all understand, the company that received it invested it within the UAE.

But wasn’t it AAR Corporation, High Fly Airlines Portugal, and German Aviation Capital—three companies—that formed High Fly X in Ireland to manage the funds?
Not exactly. Let me explain a bit. First, Nepal Airlines’ RFP itself demanded multiple elements—flight crew, engineering crew, parts supplier, financing capacity. High Fly Airlines had a slot to buy an aircraft. They were ready to sell that aircraft. When aligning with the RFP, the advice was that three companies should come together to submit the proposal.

The biggest concern was security for Nepal Airlines. If three separate companies failed or went bankrupt within the 12–18 months it takes from deposit to delivery, what would happen to the deposit? Who would Nepal Airlines fight if disputes arose between the three?

Thirdly, a new aircraft has around a three-year warranty. The company must exist until then. Otherwise, who would Nepal Airlines claim against? To ensure the promises were fulfilled, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) was formed.

Ireland was chosen because aviation laws are clear there, and there are also tax benefits in such transactions. Bills of sale were also transferred from there. An escrow agent was placed to ensure money wasn’t misused. This was not new—even when buying Boeing-757 earlier, there was an escrow agent.

So, the company was formed for Nepal Airlines’ protection. That company handled all the work. No harmful activity was done through it.

But you were AAR’s representative—how do you not know about High Fly X sending money to the UAE company?
High Fly X was owned by High Fly Portugal. The other two companies had only “cooperation.” So, AAR had no visibility into its money. It had its own directors and accounts.

I only saw the invoice for USD 2.5 million—that’s it. I saw invoices of USD 500,000 each. But deciding transfers or what to do with the money was not within my scope.

But isn’t this the same case that went to the US court? And as understood, wasn’t it stated that this money went into a company in UAE, allegedly opened by Nepalis?
Documentation like “KYC” (Know Your Client) is handled by the legal team, not by me. This is not done in thin air, these are professional matters. Another thing—under UAE law, there must be local Emirati shareholders. From what I understood, there were multiple partners. The company received the money under a cooperation agreement. Whether they were Nepali, Indian, or Emirati, or who owned what percentage—I don’t know.

So, the cooperation agreement was with High Fly X?
Initially, AAR had a contract with a Hong Kong company. AAR paid USD 150,000 to terminate that contract. Then it shifted to Dubai. High Fly X made a cooperation agreement with the Dubai company.

What is this cooperation agreement? What is the international practice?
Such practice exists in business dealings. A cooperation agreement means placing foreign representatives somewhere to provide support when needed. A deal worth USD 218 million is not small. So, a cooperation agreement was made to ensure support when needed. Big companies also do such things under “lobbying efforts.” That’s why it was done, and we found out the money stayed in UAE. The US government also found that.

Did the UAE company invest it there, or transfer it elsewhere?
We don’t know at that level of detail. From what we understood, the company received it and invested it within UAE. Whether it went into people or something else—we don’t know.

But lobbying under such a cooperation agreement—doesn’t that mean spending to manage political systems and secure one’s work?
Yes, that’s right. That is why suspicion arose. When one company gives money to another, there is always a possibility. But we did not see clear evidence of misuse. The case itself proceeded on suspicion. And whenever there is leadership, the attacks target them.

Right now, I am speaking because questions were raised. I am only sharing facts as I know them.

I worked for the company, but the world branded me a middleman. Was I a middleman, an agent, or an employee? The US court clarified that. Now even in Nepal it’s clear that Deepak Sharma was just an employee. The US court document I showed you proves Deepak Sharma didn’t take a single rupee. It shows I returned even the salary I had earned.

Yes, in Nepal’s context, suspicion always arises. When did it not? Didn’t it arise during the Boeing-757 deal? Back then we had Panchayat rule, and such issues arose then too. It happened in the Boeing-727 case as well. It happened in Airbus-320. And now it has happened in Airbus-330.

So, in your view, this was a perfectly clean deal? Neither you nor the company was involved in any wrongdoing? Shall we understand it as a transaction done in full good faith?
I can only speak to what I saw. In English, there’s a saying: “Without fire there is no smoke.” Yes, but in our country, we indulge in conspiracy. People enjoy conspiracies. It sells news, it writes stories. Even the US charge against me was “conspiracy to violate.” It wasn’t “violation,” it was conspiracy.

But weren’t you the lead from the seller’s side? Sitting within such a big system, is it believable you didn’t know?
If I had known, and if I had been informed about any division of money or payments, I would have told the court during the forensic investigation. I would have said “it happened,” not “it might have happened.” I would have spoken clearly.

Two board members of Nepal Airlines were there. I won’t name them. But when they came to Toulouse to inspect the aircraft, they even asked me inside the toilet—“What will you give us?” The irony is, both of them received immunity. One was never charged, the other walked free.

Maybe you didn’t give them anything—that’s why they walked free? Those who don’t get anything, end up free?
If so, then I should also have received immunity. The US court said I gained nothing. I also have much hope and faith in Nepal’s justice system.

Your American court verdict came on June 27, 2025. The US law under which foreign bribery cases were prosecuted had been suspended by executive order of the new president on February 10. Yet, why did your case still proceed? Why didn’t that support you?
Judge Amit Mehta himself raised this question in district court. He asked, why not under the current guidelines? There was no clear answer. The government lawyer replied that they had “approval to close the case.”

Why my case was not dismissed despite the executive order—I don’t know. From what I understood, the government had already taken 55 million dollars from the company. To dismiss it outright may have been difficult. In a way, closure had to happen. That may be why.

Earlier, you mentioned your long relationship with Nepal Airlines. Didn’t that benefit you personally?
In business, there is such a thing as “trust.” After many years, trustworthiness builds. That should not be interpreted as “corrupt behavior.”

In my professional life, I have sold about 250 large aircraft. From Qatar Airways to big corporations, I have sold aircraft. Because of my conduct, many clients return. Nowhere else have I had such issues. Worldwide I earned respect. But in my own country, even after doing good work, I was disrespected.

How hard or easy was it to close such a deal in Nepal?
It is very hard to work in Nepal. “Draconian” procedures arise. Sometimes one needs approval from one committee, sometimes from parliamentary committees, sometimes from another. Governments keep changing. A decision made by one government doesn’t hold under the next.

Then comes the anti-corruption authority. Abroad, aircraft sales are “company-to-company,” “business-to-business.” Here, it felt like you had to first meet the anti-corruption body, then the parliamentary committee, then another. How many committees? How many places? You asked why Airbus didn’t bid. Why would they, when it is made so difficult?Then comes the anti-corruption authority.

Abroad, aircraft sales are “company-to-company,” “business-to-business.” Here, it felt like you had to first meet the anti-corruption body, then the parliamentary committee, then another. How many committees? How many places? You asked why Airbus didn’t bid. Why would they, when it is made so difficult?

Then why did you do it?
That was my mistake. I made a big blunder.

Do you now feel it would have been better not to do this deal?
Yes, I feel so. Out of 250, if I had skipped two aircraft, what would have happened? Did you see me gain any personal benefit? On the contrary, I returned my salary and bonus. What did I get?

You are a person who understands Nepal’s environment and system, including what must be “managed.” How did this happen then?
If I had been able to manage, this wouldn’t have happened. People demanded from me, I couldn’t fulfill them. I didn’t get involved in that. I couldn’t manage.

Let me ask you a somewhat personal question. How is your friendship with Sugat Ratna Kansakar?
In Nepal Airlines, I had friendships with many people earlier. Some were even my father’s friends. There was respect. After 2006, I met and knew everyone. With Sugat Kansakar also, there was a professional and a bit of interpersonal relationship because we were both Nepali. But nothing beyond that.

Wasn’t the local management of this deal done by the leadership of Nepal Airlines at that time?
If you look at his interviews, he has denied it. From my side, I cannot say he did this or that. You should ask Sugat Kansakar. Only he knows. I was not with him in that way.

In your view, why did the Widebody case blow up so much in Nepal? Was it because of political forces, employees, or others?
Many groups of people were angered. For whichever political party comes into power, the opposition always uses this issue to attack. For example, some years ago, even opposition leader and former Prime Minister Deuba (Sher Bahadur Deuba) raised it in parliament. Whoever is in opposition uses it as a weapon.

In fact, during the process, all three major parties each led once. It became a political weapon. Looking at the charge sheet, you can see deep anger against Deepak Sharma. I don’t know them. I have not harmed them.

Now the Special Court has even ordered investigation into the head of the CIAA itself. Former ministers walk free; others walk free. How else can we describe this, if not as a political weapon?