KATHMANDU: Chief of the Army Staff (CoAS) Ashok Raj Sigdel has testified before the Gauri Bahadur Karki-led investigative commission that he presented then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli with two stark choices as the “Gen Z” uprising reached a tipping point on September 9 (Bhadau 24).

According to the commission’s report obtained by Nepal News, General Sigdel stated that during a high-level briefing at the Prime Minister’s residence on the morning of September 9, he advised the PM that a political solution-specifically his resignation-might be necessary to prevent further bloodshed. Alternatively, he clarified that the Nepali Army stood fully prepared to contain the situation if a formal constitutional recommendation for mobilization was made.

General Sigdel noted that while intelligence from the National Investigation Department had warned of a massive escalation as early as September 7, the National Security Council had not convened for a formal strategic session by the time the violence peaked.

“The Nepali Army is not an institution that self-mobilizes on the streets,” Sigdel stated in his deposition. “Mobilization only occurs through a formal recommendation by the Council of Ministers and a subsequent decision by the President, following established constitutional and legal procedures.”

He explained that at the time of the briefings, the Home Minister had already resigned and the ban on social media was being lifted. Under those circumstances, the government’s assessment was that the protesters’ demands were being addressed, leading to a lack of a formal decision or discussion regarding full military deployment.

The Nepali Army Chief categorically rejected criticisms regarding a lack of coordination between security agencies or a delayed response. He maintained that the military played a proactive role in securing the nation’s most sensitive infrastructure.

“The claim that the Army did not respond to requests for assistance on September 9 is factually incorrect,” Sigdel asserted. He pointed out that military fire engines were the ones to successfully extinguish blazes at the National Data Center and the Ministry of Finance’s data center within Singha Durbar.

He further claimed that the Army’s strategic presence and restraint were instrumental in protecting “Vital Installations,” including the President’s Residence (Shital Niwas), the Prime Minister’s Residence, Tribhuvan International Airport, fuel depots, and prisons across the country. “The Nepali Army does not operate without a clear mandate and constitutional provisions; this is a point of clarity everyone must understand,” he concluded.

Here is a translation of the testimony from the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashok Raj Sigdel:

I entered the Nepali Army on Falgun 3, 2043 BS (February 15, 1987) and have been fulfilling the responsibility of Chief of Army Staff since Bhadra 24, 2081 BS (9 September 2024).

In my capacity as a member of the National Security Council, I have fulfilled my duties in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution and the law during the complex and adverse situation arising from the demonstrations carried out by the Gen-Z (Generation Z) youth on Bhadra 23 and 24, 2081 BS (September 08 & 09, 2025).

In the meeting of the Central Security Committee held on Bhadra 22 (September 07, 2025), information was received from the National Investigation Department and other security agencies that the movement could become widespread. However, as no formal meeting of the National Security Council had taken place until that date, special strategic discussions could not be held. On Bhadra 23, after the security situation in the Parliament House area became complex, I gave instructions to coordinate with other security agencies as per previous decisions and make necessary security preparations; I also alerted subordinates to remain ready for the implementation of a curfew upon the request of the local administration. On that day, the Nepali Army was not mobilized, and the security arrangements were implemented under the leadership of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

On Bhadra 23, at approximately 20:00 (8:00 PM), the 39th meeting of the National Security Council was held at the Prime Minister’s residence in Baluwatar. The Nepali Army is not an institution that takes to the streets on its own; there is a provision that it can only be mobilized through the recommendation of the Council of Ministers of the Government of Nepal and the decision of the President after completing constitutional and legal processes. By the time the meeting was held, the Home Minister had already resigned, the ban on closed social media had been lifted, and it was estimated that the demands of the protesters would be addressed. Since a concrete assessment that an adverse situation would arise on the 24th was not made, no decision or discussion regarding army mobilization took place.

During the discussion held at the Prime Minister’s residence on the morning of Bhadra 24, the Prime Minister asked me for advice. I presented two options: first, since I understood that some senior officials of his own political party were suggesting he resign, a resignation might be appropriate to move toward a political solution to prevent further human loss; second, that the Nepali Army remained fully ready to control the situation if a constitutional recommendation was made. However, after the Prime Minister resigned, the security situation became even more chaotic, and the Nepali Army gradually issued communiqués/appeals and performed an active role in restoring peace and order by being fully deployed from 22:00 (10:00 PM) at night.

I reject the allegation that there was a lack of coordination between security agencies. The heads of all three security agencies were in constant contact and joint discussion, and even in risky conditions, the Nepali Army protected and rescued members of other security agencies. The Nepali Army played a proactive role in safeguarding Singha Durbar, the President’s Residence, the Prime Minister’s Residence, Tribhuvan International Airport, fuel depots, prisons, and other sensitive structures, where extreme restraint was exercised to keep human casualties at a minimum. It is necessary for everyone to be clear that the Nepali Army is not mobilized without a clear mandate and constitutional provisions. There is a constitutional provision that the army can only be mobilized according to Articles 266(1), 267(6), and 273(1) of the Constitution of Nepal.

Although complaints have been heard that the request for assistance from the Nepali Army on Bhadra 24 was not addressed in time, that is not the reality. The Nepali Army used fire engines to [extinguish the fire at] the National Data Center located in Singha Durbar and controlled the fire that broke out at the Ministry of Finance’s data center. Furthermore, vital installations such as the President’s Residence, main structures of the Prime Minister’s Residence, Tribhuvan International Airport and other airports across the country, fuel depots, and prisons were protected under the initiative of the Nepali Army. The agitated crowd gathered outside the Singha Durbar and the President’s Office premises were sent away after being given verbal warnings, firing more than 46 rounds of aerial warning shots, and being physically pushed back from the main gate multiple times while being reasoned with. Although the Nepali Army had suggested imposing a curfew starting from 05:00 AM on the morning of Bhadra 24, the curfew in Kathmandu was only declared starting from 08:30 AM; by that time, a significant presence of demonstrators had already gathered, rendering the curfew ineffective.

I have prioritized human safety over physical infrastructure. It is my view that criticisms regarding the mobilization of the army should be evaluated based on the constitutional compulsions of the time and the situational context. Joint operations were conducted to recover looted weapons and escaped prisoners, public appeals were made to return weapons, and a coordinated security mechanism was kept active.

In conclusion, it is my finding that to prevent such incidents from recurring in the future, the state’s administrative and security mechanisms must be kept free from political interference and made robust and effective on a legal basis; the National Security Council must be made even more active and responsible; and deep coordination and long-term structural reforms among security agencies are necessary.