The world is afflicted not only by political conflict but also by economic conflict as well. The high-tariff diplomacy pursued by Donald Trump’s America primarily against China and other countries, combined with the long-running Russia-Ukraine war, Israel’s attack on Gaza, and the West Asia tensions that flared after US and Israeli forces killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and other leaders, are all affecting the economies of almost every country. Meanwhile, neighboring India is signing trade agreements with major countries like the European Union, America, and Britain. And our own bilateral trade has its own joys and sorrows.

In this situation, a new government is being formed in Nepal. Citizens’ aspirations for development are running high. But economic indicators and conditions both inside and outside the country are unfavorable. What should Nepal do at such a time? What strategy should it adopt? Paras Kharel, an expert in international trade and applied microeconomics who also serves as executive director of the Kathmandu-based South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), spoke in detail with Nepal News’s Uddab Thapa. Here are edited excerpts of the conversation:

After the March 5 general election, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) is set to form a one-party strong government. Going into the election, RSP pledged to bring the economy to around USD 100 billion within five to seven years, which requires sustained high economic growth. Given the current situation inside the country and the global economic environment, how realistic does this target appear?

In Nepal’s economic history, high growth rates have not been sustained except during post-earthquake reconstruction. Given that economic growth had already started declining even before the COVID-19 pandemic, achieving these targets looks very challenging. Looking at the current sluggish economic activity, even a five-and-a-half percent growth rate appears quite difficult. Effective capital expenditure is the minimum condition for economic development, but its state is extremely poor.

Looking at the past, the government has tended to select development projects on a whim and limit them to a “project bank” in name only. The root of all these problems is the nepotism and cronyism pervasive at the policy level. The practice of promoting only party loyalists has kept capable and qualified people in the shadows. Let us hope that improves in the days ahead. Until proper planning, transparent appointments, and scientific mobilization of capital expenditure are ensured, goals of economic prosperity will remain confined to manifestos alone.

West Asian countries are suffering major economic damage from Iran’s attacks in retaliation for US and Israeli military action. How much will this affect Nepal’s economy? What should be done in preparation?

Nepal is primarily dependent on Middle Eastern countries in two ways – fuel, and employment and remittances. Nepal imports fuel from India, but India is dependent on Middle Eastern countries for fuel. The remittances coming from Middle Eastern countries are what sustain the Nepali economy. Fuel prices have already started rising. The Strait of Hormuz transit route, through which nearly 20 to 30 percent of the world’s gas and oil is transported, is disrupted. Crude oil prices are estimated to reach up to 200 US dollars per barrel in the coming days. This will cause fuel prices in Nepal to rise, with effects on the overall economy and the lives of ordinary people. When fuel prices rise, there is a chain effect.

This tension could also affect global fuel markets. It had been estimated that the amount of oil India buys from Russia would decrease somewhat due to American pressure. But if instability increases in the Middle East, India may reconsider, since comparatively cheaper Russian oil is an important alternative for India. This could also bring changes to the equations of international petroleum trade.

The most sensitive aspect for Nepal is complete dependence on imported fuel. Despite fuel supply crises arising repeatedly in the past, the country does not appear to have made adequate preparations to ensure long-term energy security. Since the 1989 blockade, petroleum storage capacity has not increased significantly. If the government had run programs encouraging the use of electric appliances, it would have helped strengthen energy security. If the widespread use of electric stoves in place of cooking gas had been promoted, dependence on fuel imports in a situation like the current one could have been somewhat reduced. But that was not done. We could not learn from the past.

As fuel prices rise, materials derived from it, such as plastic, polyester yarn and fertilizer, are also likely to become more expensive. On the other hand, there is concern that the tourism industry will take a hit, given that even attracting one million tourists a year is already a struggle. Businesspeople have started worrying that shipping costs could skyrocket as they did during the COVID-19 pandemic. If tensions in Middle Eastern countries drag on for long, thousands of Nepali workers will have to return home. Those returning from foreign employment cannot easily reintegrate here, nor is the state in a position to provide them employment. With remittances declining, the overall economy may have to bear the pressure of a recession.

What effect has the polarization seen in global trade in recent years been having on a small, import-dependent economy like Nepal?

Tensions in global trade became particularly acute after 2018, when America declared a trade war against China and imposed high tariffs on various goods. China retaliated. When Donald Trump became US president again in 2025, this intensified further. In April 2025 he broadly raised tariffs on goods from both ally and competitor countries, calling them “Liberation Day Tariffs.” For roughly seven years after 2018, China-centered trade pressure became global.

America’s such policies have brought a change in the very thinking of global trade. Previously, efficiency and comparative advantage were prioritized; the idea was that every country should produce and export whatever it had the best capacity to produce. But in recent years, resilience and diversification have come to be considered equally important. The understanding that depending on cheap and efficient production alone is not sufficient, that supply sources, trade routes, and markets must also be diversified, has been growing stronger. Even developed countries have started feeling the need for diversification. Canada, for example, was dependent on America for about 70 percent of its exports. Now that tensions have appeared in US-Canada trade relations, Canada has begun paying attention to other markets including China and India.

Nepal imports large quantities of cooking gas. But with hydropower production growing, dependence on gas imports could be reduced by expanding cooking technology that uses electricity. Although studies on this possibility have been ongoing for a long time, it never became a policy priority for the government.

This is not a new lesson for Nepal. As far back as the 1970s and 80s, Nepal had attempted export diversification. At that time, goods like carpets, tea, and cardamom reached international markets. As those goods began being exported to third countries, dependence on India-centered trade decreased somewhat. But over time, diversification efforts weakened. Along with this, import substitution is also possible in some goods. Nepal, for example, imports large quantities of cooking gas. But with hydropower production growing, dependence on gas imports could be reduced by expanding cooking technology that uses electricity. Although studies on this possibility have been ongoing for a long time, it never became a policy priority for the government.

On the question of access routes, for example, Nepal is dependent on India. Although India’s route is economically the cheapest and most convenient, the debate about the need to explore alternative transit routes has been going on for a long time. The current global supply disruptions and trade tensions are confirming that thinking was correct. On the other hand, changes are also visible in global economic trends. Western economists previously viewed import substitution and domestic industry protection negatively. But now, supply chain diversification, protection of strategic industries, and promotion of domestic production have started gaining legitimacy.

In such an environment, even if Nepal cannot adopt protectionist policies in all sectors, it can identify some strategic sectors. Policies that specifically encourage, protect, and promote agricultural and industrial goods that can create employment and become self-sufficient after a few years of support seem necessary.

The global trade uncertainty index has reached its highest level ever. What practical and psychological effects does such uncertainty have on Nepal’s exports, investment, and industrial expansion?

Uncertainty in trade policies affects both investment and trade. India is Nepal’s largest export market, and under the bilateral trade agreement many Nepali goods enter India duty-free, which has made our exports somewhat easier. But non-tariff barriers remain a challenge. For example, Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification requirements that India imposed on goods like iron, shoes, plywood, and sanitary pads had kept exporters in uncertainty for a long time. Although there was a provision requiring Indian officials to inspect Nepal’s industries to obtain certification, exports were affected due to procedural delays. Processes have become somewhat smoother in recent times.

India has signed trade agreements with major countries like the European Union, America, and Britain. Can Nepal’s exporters also find opportunities from this?

Apart from India, about 30 percent of Nepal’s exports go to countries including the European Union and America. The EU has given Nepal duty-free market access under the Everything But Arms initiative. But Nepal has not been able to fully utilize this opportunity due to limitations in production capacity and supply. Bangladesh has successfully used this same facility to greatly expand exports to the European market through its garment industry. Growing international trade tensions are also some opportunity for Nepal. But to utilize those opportunities, attention must be given to expanding production capacity, trade diversification, import substitution, and infrastructure improvement.

After America imposed 50 percent tariffs on India’s exports and 10 percent on Nepal’s, it was estimated Nepal could take advantage of this. But that did not happen. Why?

Under America’s reciprocal tariffs, Nepal had a clear advantage over some competitor countries including India for some time as Nepal’s additional tariff was around 10 percent while India’s reached up to 50 percent. But Nepal could not develop a clear strategy to exploit this opportunity.

Because Nepal’s production costs are high, its products cannot be price-competitive. According to carpet and garment businesspeople, Nepal’s production costs are at least 20 to 25 percent more expensive than competitor countries. So even if there is some tariff advantage, higher production costs make it impossible to compete in the market.

Some Nepali goods like carpets and garments were in a position to attract lower tariff rates compared to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia. On carpets, while India faced a 50 percent high rate, Nepal got 10 percent, making Nepal’s tariff nearly 9 to 10 percentage points lower than other countries on apparel too. This could have given Nepal a competitive advantage.

But no enthusiasm was seen in Nepal for that opportunity. There were mainly two reasons. First, policy uncertainty; it was not clear how long this arrangement would last. Second, Nepal’s limited supply capacity; with production, quality, and export structure being weak, it was difficult to utilize available opportunities. Another reason for failing to benefit was the open border with India. Due to the open border, there is a risk of Indian goods being misclassified or entering Nepal through informal channels. If such goods are exported to America as Nepali products, problems could arise both in credibility and regulation.

After the US Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the reciprocal tariffs, with the Trump administration then raising tariffs by 10 percent for all nations, Nepal’s comparative advantage largely disappeared. However, since goods exports represent a small share of Nepal’s total economy – less than three percent of total trade – the direct impact appears limited. On top of that, exports of goods like palm and soybean oil appear to have inflated trade figures. Meanwhile, a lack of policy coordination was also visible; cooperation between government agencies and between the government and private sector remained weak. With attention focused on political developments and elections, no concrete strategy to utilize trade opportunities was publicly visible.

Because Nepal’s production costs are high, its products cannot be price-competitive. According to carpet and garment businesspeople, Nepal’s production costs are at least 20 to 25 percent more expensive than competitor countries. So even if there is some tariff advantage, higher production costs make it impossible to compete in the market.

Temporary advantages from tariff rates alone are not enough. Without competitive costs, stable policy, and effective coordination between government and the private sector, it is difficult to utilize such opportunities. In the context of new trade agreements being made in South Asia and changing supply chains, Nepal now needs to adopt an active and clear strategy.

While countries like India and Bangladesh are securing their market access through free trade agreements, what strategies should Nepal adopt to maintain export competitiveness?

Since Nepal is set to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in November 2026, the trade benefits it currently receives will be gradually reduced. Nepal’s goods currently enjoy zero tariff benefits in the European Union and Britain. After LDC graduation, Nepal will receive this benefit in the EU for about three years, after which continuation will only be possible if GSP Plus conditions are met. Meanwhile, India has signed trade agreements with the EU and Britain, obtaining zero tariff benefits on many goods. Bangladesh has signed an economic partnership agreement with Japan, securing zero tariffs on garment exports.

The benefits Japan has given Nepal as an LDC will only be available until 2029, after which they may no longer exist. The clear signal from this is that comparative advantage based on tariff benefits is gradually eroding. Nepal must now focus on increasing competitive capacity.

I still think carpets are the most important example for Nepal. Nepal’s share in the global market for hand-woven woolen carpet exports is estimated to have reached about 12 to 14 percent, which is significant. But marketing is weak. Nepal’s participation in international trade fairs is limited, and the private sector complains that government support for this has been inadequate. Large carpet trade fairs like those in India could be organized to attract foreign buyers, which could increase trade opportunities.

Non-tariff barriers have now become a primary issue in many countries’ trade negotiations. If countries like India or Bangladesh remove non-tariff barriers, it could also ease things for Nepal. Nepal must adopt trade diplomacy that ensures the certificates it issues – certifying that its goods meet strong standards – are recognized by them.

Studies show that despite depending on imported raw materials, the carpet industry achieves at least 60 percent value addition. It employs at least 50,000 people, with significant participation from women and various communities. This industry is still dependent on imported wool. According to businesspeople, although sheep farming and wool production are possible in Nepal itself, carpet producers are not in a position to produce raw materials themselves. This is precisely where industrial policy has a role to play.

Our provincial and local governments can encourage sheep farming and wool production. If necessary, raw material production can be increased through initial subsidies, technical assistance, and coordination with the federal government. There is the example of Bhadohi in India’s Uttar Pradesh, where the carpet industry has been strengthened through research and innovation. Nepal can also learn from this.

Demand for sustainable fiber is growing in global markets. Experiments with recycling discarded fishing nets found in the sea into fiber have begun in Nepal too. Attempts to produce new types of carpets using local natural fibers like allo have also started. But administrative hassles and permit processes are causing problems for the industry. Studies have also shown that such raw materials informally flow from Nepal toward India’s industrial centers. Particularly as tariff-based advantages decline, policies that reduce costs, improve quality, and encourage innovation could be Nepal’s long-term path to advantage.

As India increases non-tariff barriers in the name of quality control orders, Nepal’s industries and supply chains are being affected. What can Nepal do now?

The main problem with exporting Nepali goods to India is non-tariff barriers. In some cases, exports have been made difficult by taxes, fees, or procedural obstacles other than customs. After India implemented the Goods and Services Tax (GST), it unified various taxes that states used to impose. That resolved some problems related to non-customs taxes. But technical, procedural, and administrative obstacles to exports have persisted.

Another problem is that clear standards have not been set for some Nepali goods. Without clear provisions on what quality, pesticide, or other technical standards a product must meet, foreign markets do not easily accept it. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, discussions had progressed on India recognizing certificates issued by Nepal’s Department of Food Technology and Quality Control for some agricultural products like tea and ginger. But after the pandemic, the process slowed.

There are international examples showing that trade barriers can sometimes be created with malicious intent. When America announced Liberation Day Tariffs, for example, the White House statement mentioned India alongside China. America specifically named India and said it would impose reciprocal non-tariff barriers in a way that fundamentally burdens it. This shows that the problem of non-tariff barriers is being experienced by other countries too.

Non-tariff barriers have now become a primary issue in many countries’ trade negotiations. If countries like India or Bangladesh remove non-tariff barriers, it could also ease things for Nepal.

India has been imposing Quality Control Orders for six years in the name of ensuring quality. But some independent Indian researchers argue that protectionist and China-targeted geopolitical objectives are also attached to this. Analysis is ongoing that India itself is being affected by provisions requiring quality assurance on some raw materials it must import from China. Even India’s own Economic Survey has suggested reconsidering the matters mentioned in quality control orders.

Non-tariff barriers have now become a primary issue in many countries’ trade negotiations. If countries like India or Bangladesh remove non-tariff barriers, it could also ease things for Nepal. Nepal must adopt trade diplomacy ensuring that the certificates it issues – maintaining strong standards for its goods – are accepted by them.

Under policies to protect domestic industries, Nepal’s industrialists receive benefits from the government. But their production is neither sufficient for domestic consumption nor cheap. Doesn’t this raise questions about the very justification of protection policy?

Many countries have adopted protection and promotion policies in the early stages of industrialization. But that should not remain in place indefinitely. A “sunset clause”, meaning a provision for review after a specific period, is considered appropriate in protection policy.

Nepal’s market structure in some industrial sectors appears very limited and concentrated. The sugar industry, for example, has only about ten active players. In such sectors, the number of buyers or importers is also limited, so the market can naturally tend toward monopoly rather than competition. This can sometimes raise suspicions of cartels or collusion. But in countries with good governance, when such suspicions arise, regulatory bodies become alert and investigate.

If illegal imports and undervaluation can be controlled, the actual protection that industry receives increases, helping to expand sales and production. As production volume increases, costs may decline, which can prepare the ground for gradually reducing protection in the future.

Nepal has also enacted a law to promote competition, but effective implementation has not happened. The provision setting a maximum profit limit has now been removed. But alongside this, improving supply chain structure is equally important. Improved transport facilities, warehouse management, and distribution systems would reduce the distance between farmers and markets. This could somewhat narrow the gap between the price farmers receive and what consumers pay. One complaint of sugar industrialists is illegal imports due to the open border. This does not mean refusing to protect; it means border surveillance must be strengthened. In essence, protection without regulated open borders is like pouring water in sand.

The sequencing of economic policy – the connection between previous and subsequent policies – is equally important in Nepal. Economic liberalization stages are generally advanced gradually. When adopting such policies, the condition of domestic industries must also be considered. Noodles produced in Nepal, for example, occupy a large share of the domestic market. About 50 percent of the shoes we wear are produced domestically. Both these sectors are considered to have about 40 percent government protection rates, although the actual protection rate may be lower due to illegal imports and undervaluation of customs particularly for shoes.

When the government provides protection, its effectiveness must be ensured. If illegal imports and undervaluation can be controlled, the actual protection that industry receives increases, helping to expand sales and production. As production volume increases, costs may decline, which can prepare the ground for gradually reducing protection in the future.

Nepal is listed to graduate from LDC status in November 2026. Given the current state of our economy, how appropriate is this LDC graduation?

Nepal had met two of the three criteria needed for LDC graduation – the Human Assets Index and the Economic Vulnerability Index – in 2015 and 2018. But Nepal received additional time due to the earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic. The per capita income criterion is also in the process of being met. Under the rules, after meeting two of the three criteria, the situation for graduating from LDC status arises.

Some say graduating from LDC is Nepal’s achievement, and improvements have indeed been made in education, health, and other human development indicators. But some have expressed concern that graduating without adequate preparation will add new challenges in trade and the economy. Graduating from LDC does not automatically increase foreign investment; Bangladesh and Laos, which remain LDCs, have much higher flows of foreign direct investment than Nepal.

Nepal’s economy is also sensitive because of its dependence on remittances. But when setting LDC graduation criteria, the share of remittances has not been included as a separate indicator. Therefore, there is also no provision to stop graduation on that basis alone.

Our main problem is weak preparation. The National Planning Commission had developed a strategy for LDC graduation and begun implementation some years ago. Nepal’s Trade Integration Strategy was also updated. But much of the work in those strategies has not been able to move forward. Free trade agreements with China, America, Australia, and Japan were supposed to be made, for example. After LDC graduation, the government cannot afford to miss the opportunity to create favorable policies for domestic producers and consumers through amendments to intellectual property rights law on medicines.

Nepal must be able to effectively utilize the three-year transition period it will receive after graduating from LDC status. If concrete plans to improve trade, investment, industry, and competitiveness can be implemented during this period, graduation can be transformed into opportunity. For that, political stability, clear policy, and implementation capacity are absolutely essential.

Nepal must be able to effectively utilize the three-year transition period it will receive after graduating from LDC status. If concrete plans to improve trade, investment, industry, and competitiveness can be implemented during this period, graduation can be transformed into opportunity. For that, political stability, clear policy, and implementation capacity are absolutely essential.

Views are also being expressed that the graduation process should be deferred for some time, citing adversities like the damage caused by the recent Gen Z protest, economic uncertainty, and the fallen morale of the private sector. That anti-corruption movement also brought the state’s structural weaknesses to the surface. However, Nepal alone cannot make this decision; processes including the UN’s readiness assessment are important. Bangladesh has also recently cited its own vulnerability and asked for the graduation process to be extended for some time. But how can one be certain that the preparations not completed until now will be done in the next three or five years? The answer required is to that doubt, isn’t it?

Nepal must be able to effectively utilize the three or six-year transition period it will receive after graduating from LDC status. If concrete plans to improve trade, investment, industry, and competitiveness can be implemented during this period, graduation can be transformed into opportunity. For that, political stability, clear policy, and implementation capacity are absolutely essential.

To receive GSP Plus benefits after graduation, some international labor and human rights conventions must be ratified by parliament. These processes have not yet been completed.

It is not that LDC graduation must happen without adequate preparation. The new government need not bear the burden of previous governments’ weaknesses. Taking the initiative to reconsider the timeline for LDC graduation falls within its authority. But if additional time is somehow obtained, it must be far more serious than before about how to use it effectively.

What immediate problems will the Nepali economy face from LDC graduation?

The major change this will bring for Nepal concerns its relationship with markets other than India. Currently Nepali goods can enter the EU, Japan, and Canada because of zero tariff benefits they provide. Without these benefits, Nepal’s exports would likely have been even more concentrated in India. So these preferential benefits have helped Nepal diversify trade to some extent.

Various studies have shown that there is also large potential for Nepal with China. According to a World Bank study, a large share of Nepal’s “missing exports” – potential but not yet realized exports – is related to China. For example, the topic of exporting buffalo meat to China has been discussed for a long time. But the problem is not just tariffs; technical regulations, quarantine management, and other health standards must also be met. Investment and time are both needed in animal husbandry, processing, thermal processing, and infrastructure.

Currently China gives Nepal zero tariff benefits as an LDC. But after graduation, those benefits will not continue. China has also not yet announced an alternative arrangement like GSP Plus. Canada is also a large potential market for Nepal, but it has not been sufficiently utilized. Although trade benefits are said to be extended for an additional three years, what happens after that is not clear.

Many of Nepal’s agricultural products can in practice be considered de facto organic. But formal certification is needed to gain recognition in international markets. Obtaining such certification requires inspection by foreign bodies, which is very costly for small entrepreneurs. The government can organize businesspeople into groups and provide partial subsidies in the certification process.

Nepal’s goods exports are only about three percent of GDP, even less if goods like oil are removed. It is argued that when LDC benefits expire, the impact will be felt in limited sectors. But even if the export volume is small, small and medium businesses involved in it could face serious consequences. Many entrepreneurs and female workers are connected to handicrafts, tea, and other small industries. Losing market access could become a major challenge for them. On the other hand, the risk of trade preference erosion has increased; as EU and British new trade agreements with India give equal benefits to other countries, the special access Nepal has been receiving gradually disappears.

Another challenge for the readymade garment industry exporting to the EU is the “double transformation” rule. Currently Nepal can import fabric, stitch and add value here, and export. But under GSP Plus, fabric must also have been produced in Nepal. That requires textile industry development and backward integration. But the government does not appear to have such preparation.

For the first time in a long time, a strong single-party government is being formed in the country. What should the new government pay special attention to regarding international trade?

Nepal has not been able to fully utilize even the potential of goods it is currently exporting. Studies show Nepal’s actual export capacity could be up to about ten times more than what is currently being achieved. This potential is visible even in traditional sectors like carpets, tea, coffee, and ready-made garments. Although the carpet industry has been involved in exports since the 1960s and the garment industry since the 1980s, expected improvements and expansion in those sectors have not happened.

Chhurpi (Nepali hard cheese) exports have grown rapidly in the last decade. Chhurpi exports initially received no government support and were not even on the list of export subsidies. This is mainly the result of identifying market information and entrepreneurship.

One reason traditional goods exports cannot grow is lack of marketing. Active participation in international trade fairs is necessary. Trade exhibitions can also be organized creatively in Nepal itself, which would help increase direct contact with international buyers.

The government has been providing subsidies for export promotion, but implementation problems are visible. With limited budget and first-come-first-served distribution, many small and medium enterprises complain they have not benefited. This program has now been suspended for some time. In the coming days, such subsidies should be restarted in a manner consistent with WTO rules and addressing real market problems.

Many of Nepal’s agricultural products can in practice be considered de facto organic. But formal certification is needed to gain recognition in international markets. Obtaining such certification requires inspection by foreign bodies, which is very costly for small entrepreneurs. The government can organize businesspeople into groups and provide partial subsidies in the certification process. This helps introduce products as organic in international markets, which is itself effective marketing.

What is indispensable for export expansion is national quality infrastructure, meaning laboratories, certification systems, and skilled personnel capable of meeting destination countries’ standards. Government investment is needed to strengthen the Department of Food Technology and Quality Control and private sector laboratories with the capacity to provide internationally recognized certification. Even with private sector initiative in products like chhurpi, the government’s role is critical in systematic market research and information dissemination. The Trade and Export Promotion Center can be helpful here.

In the area of service exports, the potential of the IT sector is growing. But here too, the need for clear policy and institutional structure is visible. New technologies like Artificial Intelligence are rapidly transforming the global IT market. In such a dynamic environment, it is necessary to develop institutional capacity to understand new opportunities and risks.

Income from IT services has started appearing effectively in Nepal’s balance of payments data in recent years, which is a positive sign. For goods exports, Nepal has trade policy, Nepal Trade Integration Strategy, or commodity development strategies. But a clear strategy specifically for the IT sector has still not been developed.

Trade expansion is not only a matter of production; it is also connected to market access, trade negotiations, and policy preparation. Considering the possibility that trade benefits from other countries may decrease in the future, we must start immediately developing capacity to protect our interests in trade negotiations. For this, the expertise of negotiators, institutional memory, and long-term strategy must be strengthened. If such improvements can be made, Nepal can prepare the foundation for gradually expanding its export potential and utilizing new markets and opportunities.

The practice of transferring secretaries and joint secretaries within a ministry in just one to one and a half years – before they can even gain subject-matter expertise – is eroding institutional capacity. The new government must pay attention to these matters and work accordingly.